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Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are 
sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is 
a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider 
a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that 
naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that 
these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal 
character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full 
resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal 
character. 
1. Introduction 
How should we characterise the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience? According to phenomenal particularism, particular external 
objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience. There has been a great deal of discussion of phenomenal 
particularism in the recent philosophy of perception literature (see, e.g., 
Soteriou (2000), Schellenberg (2010), Montague (2011)). Three common 
motivations are often given in support (Sturgeon 2008, pp. 120-122): 
1. Epistemic motivations: perceptual experience enables us to know truths 
about the particular items around us in the world. (McDowell 1982) 
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2. Semantic motivations: perceptual experience enables us to directly refer 
to and think about the particular items around us in the world. 
(McDowell 1986, Campbell 2002) 
3. Phenomenological motivations: perceptual experience seems to present 
us with the particular items around us in the world. (Martin 2002). 
In this paper we defend phenomenal particularism against a series of 
arguments that have recently been put forward by Neil Mehta (‘The 
limited role of particulars in phenomenal experience’, Journal of 
Philosophy). This defence matters because phenomenal particularism is a 
central tenet of naïve realist or relational conceptions of perceptual 
experience. Much attention has been paid in recent years to naïve realist 
accounts of perceptual experience and it would be a significant result if it 
could be shown to be false. We argue, however, that Mehta’s objections 
have no force against his naïve realist opponents. And we trace back the 
failure of his objections to unargued assumptions about the nature of 
phenomenal character – assumptions which Mehta accepts but which his 
opponents will reject. This will allow us to make some general points 
about the role introspective claims about phenomenal character play in 
assessing the truth of naïve realism and about the resources available to the 
naïve realist in explaining phenomenal character. 
2. Phenomenal Particularism 
Phenomenal particularism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of 
experience. Mehta explains phenomenal character as ‘what it’s like to have 
an experience’ (p. 311). We will follow this characterisation. Phenomenal 
particularism is the claim that the phenomenal character of experience 
sometimes contains external particulars as parts. 
Who endorses phenomenal particularism? Mehta cites the following: 
Brewer (2011), Campbell (2002), Fish (2009), Martin (2004) and (2006). 
We will follow the standard nomenclature in the philosophy of perception 
literature and refer to these authors as naïve realists. However it is worth 
being clear about why each of these authors counts as endorsing 
phenomenal particularism. They endorse it only for a subset of experiences 
namely those involved in (at least some) genuine cases of perception. 
Brewer, Campbell, Fish and Martin endorse certain views about the nature 
of perceptual experience: namely that the experiences involved in (at least 
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some) genuine cases of perception involve external particulars as 
constituents or parts in some sense. As Martin puts it ‘The naive realist 
claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent 
objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the 
naive realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-
independent objects’ (2006, p. 354). Such naive realist claims about the 
nature of experience (as with opposing sense-datum, or intentionalist 
claims) are about the nature of the phenomenal character of experience.  
On these naive realist views, external particulars are, as Mehta would put it 
‘sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience’. Naive realism 
is thus a version of phenomenal particularism in Mehta’s sense, restricted 
to just some experiences. 
Mehta presents two (sets of) objections to phenomenal particularism. The 
first turns on issues involving imaginative experiences; the second on the 
fact that we can have phenomenologically different experiences of the same 
object. We will discuss each set of objections in turn before turning to the 
assumption which underlies Mehta’s discussion. 
3. Imagination 
Mehta’s first objection concerns imaginative experiences. Although he 
takes it to be only a prima facie objection (p. 315), it is worth engaging 
with since it involves an assumption about the nature of phenomenal 
character which needs making explicit. In broad terms, the objection holds 
that phenomenal particularism is committed to providing an ‘ontologically 
messy’ (p. 317) or ‘disunified’ (p. 315) account of phenomenal character. 
Mehta begins by distinguishing pure and impure phenomenal 
particularism: pure phenomenal particularism holds that ‘the phenomenal 
character of any experience is composed wholly of particulars’; impure 
phenomenal particularism holds that ‘some phenomenal character includes 
particulars and some phenomenal character includes non-particulars 
(plausibly, properties)’ (p. 315). He holds that there is a conclusive 
objection to pure phenomenal particularism: ‘some imaginative 
experiences have phenomenal characters which clearly include no 
particulars’ (p. 315). Since none of the authors Mehta cites endorse pure 
phenomenal particularism, we will put the view to one side. 
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Impure phenomenal particularism involves two claims: that there are some 
experiences which have a phenomenal character which includes particulars 
and that there are some experiences which have a phenomenal character 
which includes non-particulars. Since Mehta takes ‘includes’ in the first 
clause to mean ‘includes as parts’, we assume that this is how he intends 
the second use of ‘includes’. The first clause is equivalent to the definition 
of phenomenal particularism. We have agreed above that it is endorsed by 
naïve realists. But the second clause is an additional commitment. Mehta 
seems to think that it follows from the fact that there are experiences the 
phenomenal character of which doesn’t include particulars as parts, that 
the phenomenal character of those experiences must include non-
particulars as parts. It doesn’t. 
Consider Martin’s account of hallucinatory experiences. According to 
Martin, the phenomenal character of causally matching hallucinations is 
exhausted by the negative epistemic criterion. More specifically, Martin 
argues that for causally matching hallucinations, ‘there is no more to the 
phenomenal character of such experiences than that of being 
indiscriminable from’ a corresponding visual perception (2006, p. 369). 
And as Martin spells out ‘being indiscriminable from’ is to be understood 
in a negative epistemic way, roughly, as a matter of being not knowably 
distinct, by means of introspection. It is open, then, for a naïve realist to 
hold that the phenomenal character of at least some imaginative 
experiences is similarly exhausted by the negative epistemic criterion and 
this doesn’t require holding that the phenomenal character of such 
experiences includes non-particulars as parts. 
Or consider the account of the phenomenal character of imagistic sensory 
imaginative experience offered by Martin in his (2002). According to 
Martin, such experience is subject to the dependency thesis according to 
which to imagine sensorily an F (e.g., a red cube) is to imagine 
experiencing an F (p. 404). So, on the phenomenal particularist model, the 
phenomenal character of an imaginative experience is explained by the 
subject representing a perceptual experience which involves external 
particulars as parts. Since a state which represents an experience involving 
external particulars as parts needn’t itself have those particulars as parts, 
this account of imaginative experience denies particularism about 
imaginative experiences. But it needn’t think that in representing a 
perceptual experience, imaginative experiences involve non-particulars as 
parts. This provides an alternative way of explaining the phenomenal 
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character of imaginative experiences compatible with phenomenal 
particularism and without taking the phenomenal character of imaginative 
experience to include non-particulars as parts. 
We can put these complications to one side: the objection that Mehta 
raises doesn’t turn on which account of the phenomenal character of 
imaginative experience naïve realists endorse. The problem with impure 
phenomenal particularism is that it provides an account of phenomenal 
character which is ‘ontologically disunified’ (p. 315). This is because it 
gives different explanations of the phenomenal character of imaginative 
experiences and the phenomenal character of genuine perceptual 
experiences: in one case the phenomenal character of experience is 
explained by its containing external particulars as parts, in the other case it 
is explained in some other way. This holds also for the two alternative 
forms of phenomenal particularism we note above. So all forms of 
phenomenal particularism will be committed to ontological disunity.  
The question is whether this is an objection: why should we expect an 
account of the phenomenal character of imaginative experience and an 
account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience to be 
ontologically unified? Mehta appeals to something like Occam’s Razor: 
‘Any simple view about the ontological nature of the parts of phenomenal 
character, such as the view that phenomenal character includes only 
properties… has a substantial prima facie advantage over impure 
phenomenal particularism’ (p. 315). His reasoning appears to be that 
unified explanations of phenomenal character are to be preferred to 
disunified explanations. 
Considerations of simplicity and parsimony only apply when we are 
comparing explanations of the same phenomenon. So for Mehta’s 
objection to be any good, there must be some thing – the phenomenal 
character of experience – which needs explaining in both the imaginative 
and perceptual case. Mehta supports this assumption by appeal to an ideal 
imaginer, one ‘whose imaginative experiences are as vivid, stable, and 
forceful as her genuine perceptual experiences’ (p. 316). Such a subject’s 
imaginative and perceptual experiences ‘obviously have substantial 
similarities in phenomenal character. But… impure phenomenal 
particularism cannot capture this’ (p. 316). 
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Does the ideal imaginer support the claim that we ought to provide an 
ontologically unified account of phenomenal character? We can contrast 
the case of ideal imagination with the case of subjectively indistinguishable 
hallucinations – a case which has received much discussion in the literature 
on naïve realism. On the assumption that subjectively indistinguishable 
hallucinations don’t involve external particulars as parts, phenomenal 
particularism is committed to thinking of them as having a different 
phenomenal character from genuine perceptual experiences. It follows that 
subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations do not have the same 
phenomenal character as genuine perceptual experiences: subjective 
indistinguishability does not suffice for sameness of phenomenal character. 
Since naïve realists are committed to denying the move from subjective 
indistinguishability to sameness of phenomenal character, they will hold 
that the case of the ideal imaginer gives no reason to think that imaginative 
experiences have the same phenomenal character as perceptual experiences. 
We won’t rehearse the discussions concerning the tenability of this denial 
here: all the naïve realists listed above endorse it and it has been a focal 
point in the philosophy of perception literature (see, e.g., Martin (1997), 
Siegel (2008), and Smith (2008)). What matters for Mehta’s objection is 
that the claim that subjective indistinguishability does not suffice for 
sameness of phenomenal character allows the phenomenal particularist to 
deny that imaginative experiences and genuine perceptual experiences have 
the same phenomenal character. Since they don’t have the same 
phenomenal character, it can hardly be a desideratum on an account of 
phenomenal character that it provide an ontologically unified account of 
the phenomenal character of imaginative and perceptual experiences. This 
draws out something which is missed in Mehta’s discussion: that naïve 
realism takes itself to be providing an account of the phenomenal character 
of just the experiences involved in (some cases of) genuine perception. The 
fact that the same account cannot be provided for imaginative experiences 
is no objection unless one already assumes that both cases must be treated 
the same. And Mehta has given us no reason for assuming so. 
More generally, it’s unclear to us how the case of the ideal imaginer is 
meant to improve on the case of subjectively indistinguishable 
hallucinations, cases which have long been recognised to pose a challenge 
to naïve realism. If anything it seems to us – purely phenomenologically – 
that the denial that imaginative experiences and perceptual experiences 
have the same phenomenal character is much more plausible than the 
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denial that genuine perceptual experiences and subjectively 
indistinguishable hallucinations have the same phenomenal character. So 
the phenomenal particularist’s response looks stronger for the case of 
imaginative experiences than it does for hallucination. 
Be that as it may. The point is that the fact of ontological messiness is only 
objectionable if one assumes that imaginative experiences have the same 
phenomenal character as genuinely perceptual experiences. Since this will 
simply be denied by the phenomenal particularist, there is no theoretical 
virtue in an account which gives an ontologically unified explanation of 
the phenomenal character of imaginative experiences and the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experiences. Ontological disunity poses no 
problem. 
Finally, note that the only reason Mehta gives us for thinking that 
imaginative and perceptual experiences have the same phenomenal 
character is that we can imagine subjectively indistinguishable imaginative 
and perceptual experiences. And this assumes that phenomenal character of 
experience is transparent to us: that we can move from two experiences 
being indistinguishable to them having the same phenomenal character. 
But this assumption is rejected by naïve realists. In the terminology of 
Martin (2004), the phenomenal particularist is committed to a modest 
view of what a subject can know about the phenomenal character of her 
own experiences on the basis of introspection. Immodest accounts of our 
knowledge of the phenomenal character of our own experiences has come 
under attack recently, both philosophically (Williamson 2000) and 
empirically (Schwitzgebel 2008). Mehta’s objections to phenomenal 
particularism assume an immodest account of such knowledge.  
This draws out something that Martin has long emphasised: debates about 
the phenomenal character of perceptual experience intersect with issues 
concerning our access to the phenomenal aspects of our mind. Ignoring 
the second of these issues can lead one to think one has good objections to 
positions in the first. The truth or falsity of phenomenal particularism will 
not be settled by phenomenologically motivated counter-examples but by 
reflection on the kind of access we have to our own minds and its 
implications for perceptual experience. 
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To conclude: Mehta’s first objection relies on an assumption about the 
phenomenal character of experience which phenomenal particularists 
already have reason to reject. There is no objection here to phenomenal 
particularism. 
4. The Similarities of Experiences 
Mehta’s second objection is that ‘the phenomenal particularist makes 
implausible predictions about similarities and differences in phenomenal 
character’ (p. 317). He considers this objection in three forms, taking only 
the last one to be dialectically effective. It will be worth going through 
each of his cases. 
The first concerns the experience of distinct but perceptually 
indistinguishable objects. The objection runs as follows: these experiences 
include different external particulars. So according to phenomenal 
particularism they have different phenomenal characters. But they have the 
same phenomenal character. So phenomenal particularism is false. Mehta 
renounces this objection because he holds that it is open to the 
phenomenal particularist to say that although the experiences have 
different token parts, they have parts of just the same type, and that 
suffices for them having the same phenomenal character. 
We’re not sure how this response on behalf of phenomenal particularism is 
meant to work or whether or not it is compatible with the naïve realist 
authors under consideration. But that doesn’t matter, because there is a 
simpler reason why the objection is dialectically ineffective: it assumes that 
the experiences of distinct but perceptually indistinguishable objects have 
the same phenomenal character. And, as we have seen above, this will be 
denied by the phenomenal particularist  (Brewer, for instance is quite 
explicit about this – see his (2011), p. 98). Mehta recognises this, citing 
Soteriou (2000) in a footnote who notes that the challenge of explaining 
the perceptual indistinguishability of distinct but perceptually 
indistinguishable objects can be met by recognising that my experience of 
each twin makes me aware of precisely the same external properties. This is 
not enough, Mehta claims, because ‘the challenge is to explain the sameness 
in phenomenal character of my experiences of [distinct but perceptually 
indistinguishable objects]’ (fn. 18). Yet whether there is sameness of 
phenomenal character is precisely what is at issue.  
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The second form of the objection concerns perceptual and hallucinatory 
experiences. It runs as follows: there are hallucinatory experiences which 
are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptual experiences. Since the 
latter contain external particulars as parts which the former lack, they have 
different phenomenal characters according to phenomenal particularism. 
But they have the same phenomenal character. So phenomenal 
particularism is false. 
The problem with this objection, as Mehta realises, is that phenomenal 
particularists will deny that perceptual and hallucinatory experiences have 
the same phenomenal character. This denial has been at the forefront of 
much discussion in the debate about naïve realism, but Mehta gives us no 
reason here to think it is problematic. So far we have no objection to 
phenomenal particularism. 
The third form of the objection is meant to be decisive. Instead of 
considering indistinguishable experiences of different objects, Mehta 
considers disintinguishable experiences of the same object (p. 318ff). Two 
examples are provided. The first concerns the difference in phenomenal 
character involved in experiencing the same object in different sense-
modalities. The second concerns seeing the same person from the front 
and back. The objection is as follows: these experiences have the same 
external particular as a part. So according to phenomenal particularism, 
they have the same phenomenal character. They don’t have the same 
phenomenal character. So phenomenal particularism is false. 
This objection is no better than the others. The problem is with the 
second step in the argument. It doesn’t follow from the fact that these 
experiences have the same external particular as a part that they have the 
same phenomenal character according to phenomenal particularism. 
Mehta’s argument assumes that the particularist or naïve realist is 
committed to the idea that if these experiences differ in phenomenal 
character, then they must differ in the particulars they constitutively 
involve. But, contra how Mehta construes their position, naïve realists are 
simply not committed to the idea that the phenomenal character of 
experiences is exhaustively constituted by the particulars (even external 
property-instances) constitutively involved in those experiences. They don’t 
hold that experience is radically transparent to its objects in the way that 
some sense-datum theorists did. They are thus not committed to the idea 
that sameness of external particulars (including property-instances) implies 
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sameness of character. This comes out clearly in, for instance, Martin 
(1998), Campbell (2009, 2011), and Brewer (2011). 
Martin thinks that ‘to have an experience is to have a viewpoint on 
something: experiences intrinsically possess some subject-matter which is 
presented to that viewpoint. To understand such experience and what it is 
like, one has to understand that viewpoint on that subject-matter, and hence 
also to attend to the subject-matter as presented to the viewpoint’ (p. 173, 
emphasis added). Experiencing an object is experiencing it from a 
particular viewpoint. The phenomenology of experience is thus not 
exhausted by experience's subject-matter (what is presented to one).  
Similarly Campbell says ‘We have to factor in the standpoint from which 
the scene is being observed... You always experience an object from a 
standpoint’ (2009, p. 657). And Campbell explains how this point is to 
figure in the proper way to conceive of the naive realist theory of 
experience: ‘We should think of consciousness of an object not as a two-
place relation between a person and an object, but as a three place relation 
between a person, a standpoint, and an object’ (p. 657). 
Campbell packs a lot into a standpoint. We can think of the standpoint 
involved in an experience as comprising an ensemble of various factors: 
The notion of a standpoint must encompass more than merely the 
position of the observer... (p. 657)... to describe the standpoint 
explicitly we have to say which sensory modality is involved; and that 
will determine further factors we have to fill in. For example, suppose 
the modality is vision. The we need, further, position, but also relative 
orientations of the view and object, how close the viewer is to the 
object, whether there is anything obstructing the light between them, 
and so on (p. 658). 
And elsewhere he notes that ‘Consideration of the dynamic aspects of 
perception will bring a lot of further factors into play: the focus of the 
subject's attention, the context of the subject's perceptions before the 
current moment, and so on’ (2011, p. 49). 
Finally, Brewer's development of his version of naive realism takes a similar 
form:  
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perceptual experience is a matter of a person's conscious acquaintance 
with various mind-independent physical objects from a given 
spatiotemporal point of view, in a particular sense-modality, and in 
certain specific circumstances of perception (such as lighting conditions 
in the case of vision). These factors effectively conjoin to constitute a 
third relatum of the relation of conscious acquaintance that holds 
between perceivers and the mind-independent physical objects of their 
perceptual experience (Brewer 2011), p. 96)... This has the effect of 
integrating what may often be regarded as factors to be cited in 
explanation of why a person has the specific perceptual experience that 
he does on certain occasions into the constitutive account of the nature 
of his perceptual experience itself (p. 100, fn 5). 
If experience, on the naive realist picture, is a simple two-place relation 
between a subject and an object, and the object is held to be all there is to 
the phenomenal character of the experience, then it may be hard to see 
how distinct experiences in different modalities, holding fixed the object, 
can have different phenomenal characters. And it may be hard to see how 
experiences of the same individual from two different points of view can 
have different phenomenal characters. But this is at best a caricature of the 
view, as the passages above make clear. Brewer is quite explicit about how 
invoking the ‘third relatum’ in the account of perceptual experience 
forestalls the implausible idea that distinct experiences of intrinsically the 
same object in distinct modalities or from different points of view must 
have the same phenomenal character (p. 96). 
These quotes indicate that naive realism is not committed to the claim that 
sameness of external particular entails sameness of phenomenal character. 
Thus Mehta’s argument against naïve realism fails. As Campbell puts it - 
in a sentence which exactly maps onto the two forms of Mehta’s objection: 
[i] f we had only the two-place relation between the perceiver and the 
scene, that would not allow us to differentiate an object being touched 
from an object being seen, or an object viewed from one angle from the 
same object being viewed from another angle (2011, p. 48) 
The addition of a third component into the naive realist account allows it 
to avoid Mehta’s objection, and this third component should not be 
neglected in evaluating naïve realism. 
To conclude: none of these objections has any force against the 
phenomenal particularist. The first two rest on the assumption that 
subjectively indistinguishable experiences have the same phenomenal 
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character; the third ignores the resources actually invoked by phenomenal 
particularists.  
5. Conclusion 
Mehta presents us with two sets of objections to phenomenal 
particularism. And he means these objections to have force against naive 
realist accounts of perceptual experience. The first set of objections assume 
that subjectively indistinguishable experiences have the same phenomenal 
character. The second set of objections assume that phenomenal 
particularists must hold that experiences of the same external particular 
have the same phenomenal character. Both assumptions are rejected by 
naive realism. 
Our discussion allows us to draw out two general morals. First, in arguing 
against naïve realism we cannot just assume an immodest account of our 
knowledge of phenomenal character. If any such account is to inform an 
argument against naïve realism, it has to be earned. Second, in arguing 
against naïve realism we should draw on the full resources the account has 
to offer. In particular, naïve realists can exploit the standpoint from which 
one perceives, in addition to the objects of perception, in accounting for 
the phenomenal character of experience. (Mehta is not alone in neglecting 
this, see also Block 2010.) We have been given no reason to reject 
phenomenal particularism. 
  
References 
Block, Ned (2010). “Attention and Mental Paint”. In: Philosophical Issues 
20, pp. 23—63. 
 
Brewer, Bill (2011). Perception and its Objects. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Campbell, John (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
—  (2009). “Consciousness and Reference”. In: The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Mind Ed. by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and 
Sven Walter. Oxford University Press, pp. 648–662. 
 
13 
—  (2011). “Relational Vs Kantian Responses to Berkeley’s Puzzle”. In: 
Perception, Causation, & Objectivity. Ed. by Johannes Roessler, Hemdat 
Lerman, and Naomi Eilan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fish, William (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Mehta, Neil (2014). “The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal 
Experience”. In: Journal of Philosophy Volume CXI, pp. 311–331 
 
Martin, Michael G. F. (1997). “The Reality of Appearances”. In: Thought 
and Ontology. Ed. Mark Sainsbury. Franco Angeli. 
 
__ (1998) “Setting Things Before the Mind”. In: Current Issues in 
Philosophy of Mind. Ed. by Anthony O’Hear. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 157–179.  
 
—  (2002). “The Transparency of Experience”. In: Mind and Language 17, 
pp. 376–425.  
 
__ (2004) “The Limits of Self-Awareness”. In: Philosophical Studies 120, 
pp. 37–89. 
 
—  (2006). “On Being Alienated”. In: Perceptual Experience. Ed. by Tamar 
Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Montague, Michelle (2011). “The phenomenology of particularity”. In: 
Cognitive Phenomenology. Eds. T. Bayne & M. Montague. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Schellenberg, Susanna (2010). “The Particularity and Phenomenology of 
Perceptual Experience”. In: Philosophical Studies 149 (1), pp. 19–48. 
 
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2008). “The Unreliability of Naive Introspection”. In: 
The Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273. 
 
Siegel, Sussanna (2008) “The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination”. In: 
Disjunctivism, Perception, Action, Knowledge. Ed. by Adrian Haddock and 
Fiona Macpherson. Oxford University Press. 
 
Smith, A.D. (2008) “Disjunctivism and Discriminability”. In: 
Disjunctivism, Perception, Action, Knowledge. Ed. by Adrian Haddock and 
Fiona Macpherson. Oxford University Press. 
 
Soteriou, Matthew (2000). “The Particularity of Visual Perception”. 
European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2), pp. 173–189. 
14 
 
Sturgeon, Scott (2008). “Disjunctivism about Visual Experience.” In: 
Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Ed. by Adrian Haddock and 
Fiona Macpherson, Oxford University Press. 
 
Williamson, Timothy, (2001). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
